Why does the TSA persist despite being widely considered useless, if…

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Why does the TSA persist despite being widely considered useless, if not counterproductive?

Part of the issue is that TSA employees have strong incentives to block reform, as they stand to lose their main source of income if the TSA goes away. Whereas, every flyer annoyed by the TSA doesn't have much incentive to act, since the costs of acting generally far outweigh any benefit they'll receive.

But perhaps there's a way around the "concentrated benefit, diffuse cost" problem.

Suppose you form a reform group, whose mission would be to pass legislation that abolishes and/or substantially reforms the TSA.

As part of that legislation, the money that would've gone to the TSA budget for say, the next three years, instead goes into a pool. A third of the pool would go toward retraining TSA employees, and two-thirds would be distributed amongst the reform group members if they succeed in getting the legislation passed.

The TSA's annual budget is 7.55 billion, so this could potentially pay roughly $15 billion to the reform groups coffers.

This would concentrate some of the benefits of abolishing the TSA to a small group, thus incentivizing the reform group to exert the costly efforts needed to remove the TSA. The public would still be out three years worth of the TSA's budget, but after that they would be free of the TSA, so they would also benefit in the long run.

Thoughts?