Four organizations, and the difference between them is what sits between you and the model. Abliteration AI runs a policy-as-code gateway in front of uncensored weights; Cantina Security is a penetration-testing company that released its own open-weights security model; Venice.AI sells privacy and no retention; huihui-ai publishes abliterated weights on Hugging Face. Where a company filters, the red cells describe that filter, not the model behind it.
| Provider | X Profile | URL | Description | CSAM | Sexual | Self-harm | Gore | Hate | Harass | Defam. | PII | Crime | Arms | WMD | Cyber | Fakes | Elec. | Advice | IP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abliteration AI 1 | @abliteration_ai | abliteration.ai | Hosted uncensored inference API with OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible endpoints, aimed at red teams, trust and safety, synthetic-data generation, and security research. Every request passes a configurable policy-as-code gateway. | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | Yes | cfg | Yes | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg | cfg |
| Cantina 2 | @cantinasecurity | cantina.security | Security company (agentic pentesting and security operations) that released Apex Flash-1, an open-weights security-research model, plus an abliterated variant for researchers who want more control over refusals in their own workflows. | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Venice.ai 5 | @AskVenice | venice.ai | Private, uncensored AI service for text, image, video, audio, and code on open-source models, with no data retention and privacy tiers up to trusted execution and end-to-end encryption. | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| huihui-ai 6 | @support_huihui | huggingface.co/huihui-ai | Publishes abliterated builds of open models -- Qwen, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniCPM, and others -- with 150-plus abliterated weights on Hugging Face. | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
Footnotes
- Abliteration AI, product site. Abliteration AI, accessed 2026-10-15. https://abliteration.ai -- the gateway's documented outcomes are allow, refuse, rewrite, redact, and escalate; its own example log shows "How can I dox someone on Twitter?" refused by a harm-to-others rule (the Harass and PII cells) while a CVE proof-of-concept is allowed. ^1
- Cantina Security, "Apex Flash-1" model card. Hugging Face, accessed 2026-10-15. https://huggingface.co/cantina-security/apex-flash-1 -- the card documents usage only and states no per-category policy, so the green row reflects the purpose of the abliterated variant rather than a documented test; treat this row as the weakest evidence in the table. ^1
- Venice.AI, "Terms of Service," Section 12 (Prohibited Conduct). Venice.AI, accessed 2026-10-15. https://venice.ai/tos -- the red cells are exactly the clauses: (a) illegal purpose, (b) child exploitation including AI-generated material, (c) third-party rights including intellectual property and privacy, name, voice, image or likeness without consent, (f) malicious code, (g) fraud and impersonation. Section 12 does not name adult sexual content, self-harm, violence, hate speech, harassment, defamation, weapons, elections, or professional advice. ^1
- huihui-ai, model publisher profile. Hugging Face, accessed 2026-10-15. https://huggingface.co/huihui-ai -- abliterated builds of Qwen, GLM, DeepSeek, MiniCPM and other open models; the published weights carry the refusal removal with them. ^1